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Abstract 
Previous comparative electoral studies using aggregate data indicate the importance of party-
system variables, such as polarization and the number of parties, with regard to the level of 
volatility between two elections. Research using individual level data has shown elements, 
such as political knowledge, political disaffection and party identification, explain why voters 
remained faithful to their party or not. Until now, no study has investigated these variables 
simultaneously on individual level data using a large set of elections. This study fills that 
important gap in the literature using data from 29,591 voters in 33 elections. We find 
polarization influences party-switching at the individual level, rather than the sheer number 
of parties, as aggregate-level analyses suggest. 
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1. Introduction  
Until the end of the 1970’s electoral research focused on personal characteristics and the 
social environment of the citizen as determinants of the vote choice (Berelson et al., 1963; 
Campbell et al., 1963; Key, 1966; Lazarsfeld et al., 1949). It was not until 1979 that Pedersen 
drew attention to the effect of the political system on party switching, finding a clear link 
‘between the number of options open to the individual voter, and the voters’ propensities to 
transfer votes between parties.’ (Pedersen, 1979: 14). As an important limitation, Pedersen 
used only aggregate, country level, data of volatility to describe this individual-level 
phenomenon. Ever since, the standard research approach in this area examines party system 
characteristics and vote change at the aggregate level. 
A number of assumptions have to made for inferences about the individual-level to be valid 
when using aggregate data of net volatility to investigate party switching. One of the key 
assumptions being that no single voter abstains from voting. If individual-level data are used, 
by contrast, we can focus only on those voters who voted in two consecutive elections. This 
should give a much more exact estimate of the effect of the party-system on party switching1.  
Pedersen additionally assumed party switching is driven by the voters' perception of the 
average distance between parties when there are more of them, and not the number of parties 
by itself. Voters will be more likely to consider leaving the party they previously voted for as 
the number of ideologically proximate parties increases. Furthermore, Pedersen considered 
the interchangeability between the number of parties and polarization as a truism. Later 
                                                             
1In this article we distinguish between volatility, which refers to the total amount of change in electoral choice 
between two elections and party switching which only refers to voters that voted in two consecutive elections 
and voted for a different party at both occasions. Volatility includes switching between parties, but also between 
abstention and a vote for a party and vice-versa.  
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empirical research, however, points out that the number of parties and polarization are best 
treated as distinct elements of a party system.  
In this article, we assess whether the link between party switching and the characteristics of 
the party system is driven by individual-level dynamics and caused by polarization in the 
party system, or by the number of parties. We will, however, also take into account a number 
of individual level predictors of switching.  To do this we use the data from the Comparative 
Study of Electoral Systems (CSES).  
We start the paper with an overview of the literature on volatility and party switching, in 
which we highlight the contextual and individual causes of both concepts. Next we present 
the data and methods used for the analyses. After describing the results we end with some 
concluding remarks and caveats of the current paper. 
 
2. Literature 
In liberal democracies, political parties are the organized expression of ideological diversity 
in the political sphere (Ware, 1996). They are expected to place themselves at the most 
advantageous position in ideological space in order to maximize their potential electorate 
(Downs, 1957). As the seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) pointed out, several 
cleavages exist in western societies that strongly differentiate political parties. This cleavage 
structure causes voters to be strongly aligned to particular parties and a large section of 
society was said to be ‘frozen’ into these cleavages. But as Blondel (1968) pointed out, some 
electoral fluctuation is absolutely necessary to keep democratic systems structurally balanced. 
Identifying the voters who switch parties, therefore, became—and still is—a prominent field 
of study in political science. 
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Several scholars have drawn attention to a trend of increasing electoral volatility since the 
late 1970s (Crewe and Denver, 1985; Dalton et al., 2002; Pedersen, 1979; Rose and 
Mcallister, 1986). This trend is considered an indication that the old ties between voters and 
parties have waned, resulting in ‘dealignment’. The literature identifies the important role the 
party system plays in explaining party switching. Studies in this area often reference the 
relationship between party switching and either the number of parties, or the dispersion of the 
parties in an ideological issue space. Using data from 103 elections from 1945-1975, 
Pedersen found a clear link between the number of parties and net volatility. He explained 
this relationship with reference to polarization as the causal mechanism. Even though the 
theoretical mechanism was situated at the individual level, Pedersen could only find 
indications for it at an aggregate level. He therefore concluded his paper by saying that that 
his findings warranted further study with individual level data. So far no one has 
systematically tested the impact of these contextual variables at the individual level. We 
address this gap in the literature by means of a specific focus on the contextual causes of 
volatility and party switching by means of aggregate and individual-level data, respectively. 
2.1. The Political System 
The literature identifies two important structural features of a political system in relation to 
electoral party switching: the number of parties, on the one hand, and the ideological 
polarization of these parties, on the other.  
These two concepts are generally considered to be closely related. More electoral parties are 
regularly considered synonymous with more polarization (Pedersen, 1979; Sartori, 2005). 
Crepaz (1990) initially found an empirical relationship between polarization and the number 
of parties, but using more refined data analyses it has been shown that the number of parties 
in and of itself is not indicative of more extreme positioning of parties (Budge and 
5 
 
McDonald, 2006; Ezrow, 2008). Dalton and Anderson (2011) also found no significant 
correlation between the number of parties and polarization2 in their investigation using the 
large CSES dataset. It is therefore logical to treat them as two distinct contextual variables in 
this paper.    
Considering the number of parties in a party-system, we would expect there to be a linear 
relationship between the number of parties and electoral party switching. The likelihood that 
a voter has an alternative to her previous choice that is worthy of her vote increases with the 
number of parties (Blais and Gschwend, 2010). While it might appear to be conventional 
wisdom that more parties foster party switching, not all research finds a significant effect of 
the number of parties on levels of party switching. Looking at newer democracies, some 
scholars are inconclusive about the effect of the number of parties on net volatility (Epperly, 
2011; Roberts and Wibbels, 1999). Most of the available research, however, indicates a 
significantly more volatile system as the number of parties increases (Bartolini and Mair, 
1990; Crewe and Denver, 1985; Lane and Ersson, 2007; Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007). The 
reason why most research still assumes more party switching in larger party systems, 
however, relates to ideological proximity rather than the number of options voters have per se 
(Tavits, 2005; Toka, 1998). 
The degree of polarization in an electoral context is assumed to strongly affect party 
switching. There are a number of reasons for this theoretical expectation. First, one 
expectation in the literature  is that polarization and party switching are inversely related. 
This logic is derived from the idea Downs (1957) defended in his Economic Theory of 
Democracy: if polarization is high, the ideological spacing between parties will increase, 
                                                             
2Even though we use a slightly different set of elections from the CSES compared to Dalton & Anderson we 
also found no correlation between the effective number of electoral parties and polarization in our dataset 
(results available from the authors on request). 
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making a switch less likely (Hazan, 1997). There is some indirect evidence supporting this 
idea. The correlation between a voter’s placement on a left-right scale and the position of the 
party she votes for is significantly higher in more polarized elections (Dalton, 2008). This 
indicates that, when offered a more diverse set of options, voters will find a party closer to 
their own position and have less reason to switch. Similarly, the relation between self-
placement on a left-right scale and having a party-affiliation was found to be stronger in 
polarized party systems (Curini and Hino, 2012; Freire, 2008). The effect of ideological 
polarization on volatility has also been investigated at a macro-level. Typically,this has been 
done by controlling for the number of parties in a system. Tavits (2005: 286) for example 
makes the strong argument that in highly polarized systems “switching one’s vote would 
mean trading one’s ideology”. Both Roberts and Wibbels (1999) and Tavits (2005) find 
significant effects indicating that polarization decreases net volatility when controlling for the 
number of parties in a party system.  
A second reason to assume volatility is reduced in strongly polarized systems can be found in 
the ‘supply’ side of the electoral spectrum. In highly polarized systems, parties are more 
likely to be organized around specific cleavages that are the basis of polarization itself (Mair, 
1995). This might refrain parties from going into competition for certain parts of the 
electorate that are considered “unattainable” (Bardi and Mair, 2008). Conversely, as Mair 
(1995) contends, if parties lose their distinct profiles, they will end up fishing in the same 
broader pool of voters, and this makes it more likely that these voters will switch for more 
valence-based differences, such as a more attractive party leadership (Deegan-Krause and 
Enyedi, 2010; but see Vegetti, 2014). 
Several scholars found a weak negative effect of polarization on volatility. All of them, 
however, used aggregate data which only allows a rudimentary estimation of gross volatility 
(Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Roberts and Wibbels, 1999; Tavits, 2005). The reasoning of 
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theories about the effects of the number of parties and polarization however, is clearly at the 
individual level and relates to party switching. Testing these contextual theories by means of 
individual data can therefore be considered a prerequisite for understanding the mechanisms. 
 
Following this review of the literature, the two contextual hypotheses that will be investigated 
in this paper are: 
 
Hypothesis 1: An increasing number of parties will increase the probability of party 
switching  
Hypothesis 2: A higher level of polarization in the party system will decrease the 
probability of party switching.  
 
2.2. Individual-level controls 
Although the focus of this paper is on the influence of contextual level variables on party 
switching, it is important to take into consideration individual-level predictors of switching as 
well. In this regard, party identification is generally considered a crucial variable in voting 
behaviour research (Dalton, 2013) and in research on party switching more specifically. As 
an important vote choice heuristic, partisanship acts to stabilize voting behaviour (Lachat, 
2007).  
Furthermore, political sophistication is widely regarded to have an effect on party switching. 
The first survey-based research on what causes voters to switch parties concluded: ‘Stability 
in vote is characteristic of those interested in politics and instability of those not particularly 
interested’ (Berelson et al., 1963: 20). Scholars nowadays expect a curvilinear effect of 
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political sophistication on party switching, with most switching among the middle 
sophisticated (Dassonneville and Dejaeghere, 2014; Kuhn, 2009; Lachat, 2007). 
Finally, political attitudes are regularly included in models to understand what makes people 
switch votes. Scholars seem to agree that disaffection with politics is associated with 
volatility. With his ‘frustrated floating voter hypothesis’, Zelle (1995) drew attention to the 
fact that volatile voters are less satisfied with the political system and less trusting in politics. 
Switching parties should therefore be considered as a voter’s manifestation of a mood of 
protest. Recent findings seem to confirm this pattern of disaffection leading to volatility for a 
number of different countries (Dalton and Weldon, 2005; Dassonneville, 2012; Söderlund, 
2008).  
Self-evidently, socio-demographic factors such as gender and levels of education have to be 
controlled for. Additionally, previous research has pointed out that citizens’ attitudes stabilize 
as they grow older (Alwin and Krosnick, 1991). The same has been found with respect to the 
stability of vote choices (Dassonneville, 2013; Gomez, 2013). Consequently, we expect to 
find a negative effect of age on party switching, which would indicate that older voters have 
more stable party preferences. 
3. Data and methods 
3.1. Data 
We test the hypotheses outlined above using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems (CSES 2007; 2012). The CSES is a standardized cross-national election survey 
administered after elections in over fifty countries3. Starting with the second CSES module a 
                                                             
3All the technical and methodological information for the surveys included in the CSES can be found at 
www.cses.org. 
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recall question was administered to gauge for voting behavior in the previous election. This 
allows us to compute the total amount of party switching between elections. Recall questions 
can be argued to be sub-optimal measures for investigating volatility because they will 
stimulate false reports of stability (Festinger, 1957). Previous research has indicated that the 
use of recall questions leads to an underestimation of volatility. The typical reasons for this 
underestimate include memory problems and the fact that voters tend to – consciously or 
subconsciously – adjust their previous vote to be in line with their preference (van Der Eijk 
and Niemöller, 1983; Waldahl and Aardal, 2000). The extent to which respondents correctly 
recall their previous vote is usually assumed to be correlated to individual-level variables that 
are linked to party switching (Converse, 1962). The empirical evidence for such systematic 
correlations, however, is scarce (van Der Eijk and Niemöller, 2008). For the purpose of the 
current analyses, it is important to observe that the errors in the vote shares of the previous 
election do not correlate significantly to any of the contextual level variables4.  
We use a subset of election studies in the CSES that included a recall question (see Appendix 
I). Additionally, we cross-validated the data by comparing the recalled voting behavior of 
respondents in the estimation sample with official election results (see Appendix III). Only 
election samples in which there were no grave biases of the recalls vis-à-vis the actual results 
were retained for the analyses.5 This step considerably reduces the number of elections in our 
sample and strongly reduces the number of newer democracies included. Obviously, this 
                                                             
4
 These analysis are available from the authors on request 
5
 We excluded elections in which the results for one or more a parties result diverged by more than 7.5 
percentage points compared to the official result and for which a similar bias (more than 5 percentage points) 
could not be observed for the current election. This way we assure that elections with problematic recall 
questions are eliminated. Moreover, as in some cases these differences clearly originate in coding errors for 
parties, we also see this as an indicator for the general reliability of the coding of party-choice for those 
elections. See Appendix I for details on which elections were retained. More stringent cut-off points were tested 
and our results proved robust in these cases. Results available from the authors upon request. 
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limits the generalizability of our findings to established democracies only, but we can 
confidently say that doing so prevents generalizations based on flawed data. 
Aggregate measures of net volatility use election results and thus imply that the changes 
observed can also be caused by increases or decreases in turnout levels rather than party-
changes alone. For investigating the impact of the party system on party switching only, we 
restrict the sample to those respondents who voted in both the current and the recalled 
election.  
We furthermore restricted the dataset to surveys for parliamentary elections and to elections 
that were conducted freely according to Freedom House. We excluded presidential elections 
as in these cases leadership characteristics are much more important elements of electoral 
choice and so they are less influenced by the party-system variables (Aarts et al., 2011). The 
absence of questions for the construction of our key independent variables further reduced the 
number of elections retained somewhat (see Appendix I on which elections were excluded 
and the reasons for doing so).  
Party splits or mergers have the potential to complicate our operationalization of party 
switching. The disappearance of a party, or the combination of multiple parties, forces a voter 
to reevaluate the contours of the ideological space. In many cases, however, the new party is 
very similar to the old one, rendering it debatable if the voter can be considered volatile. To 
decide on who to label as a ‘party-switcher’, we looked up the electoral report of all elections 
in our sample in Electoral Studies, the European Journal of Political Research or West 
European Politics. Based on this documentation we decided whether a party could be labeled 
as ‘new’ or a compilation/splintering of former parties. Extensive information on what 
changes were considered party switching is provided in Appendix II. 
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3.2. Measurements 
Our models incorporate a number of summary statistics developed in the literature. First, we 
measure the effective number of electoral parties as proposed by Laakso and Taagepera 
(1979).  
Second, almost all regularly-used indices of polarization are based on the position of the 
parties on a single left-right continuum (Abedi, 2002; Crepaz, 1990; Lijphart, 1999). 
Respondents are capable of meaningfully placing different parties on a same left-right issue 
scale (Budge and McDonald, 2006; Freire, 2008). Furthermore, recent work indicates that 
voters’ placement of parties correlate highly with expert judgments or party placements 
obtained from political elites (Dalton and McAllister, 2013). Therefore, we are confident that 
using voters’ placement of parties on a left-right scale within CSES is a valid basis for 
computing different measures of polarization.  
Three general groups of polarization indices—that differ slightly in terms of how the concept 
is operationalized—are present in the literature. Polarization indices of the first type are 
simply based on parties’ left-right placements. The distance between the most extreme left 
and right parties is then calculated as a measure of polarization (Abedi, 2002; Crepaz, 1990; 
Indridason, 2011). Even though this measure is argued to be less suitable in multiparty 
settings, we will use an unweighted measure gauging the distance between the two most 
extreme parties as a first measure of polarization. A second type of index uses information 
from all parties and is weighted for their relative strength. As a second measure in our 
analyses, we replicated such a measure constructed by Dalton (2008)6. A third type of 
indicator incorporates the variance of the electorate and keeps the full amount of information 
                                                             
6
 Formula: �݋݈�ݎ�ݖ�ݐ�݋݊��௟�௢௡ = √∑௡�=1 ݌�ሺሺ݌�ݎݐݕ��� − ݉��݊��ሻ 5⁄ ሻ² 
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from all parties. Alvarez and Nagler’s (2004) measure of compactness, for example, not only 
looks at how dispersed the parties are on a left-right scale, but also relates this to the 
dispersion of the general population7. Although the measure was initially developed to look at 
separate issues, Ezrow (2007) has demonstrated this can also be applied to the general 
ideological placement of voters and parties.8  
To verify the robustness of our findings, we perform our analyses with an index from each of 
these groups separately. All polarization indices include somewhat different information but 
obviously the three indices used are strongly correlated.9 To prevent multicolinearity 
problems in the analyses we will test the impact of each of the measures separately. 
We account for the fact that differences in electoral systems are linked to volatility. The 
proportionality of an electoral system correlates strongly to the number of parties (Neto and 
Cox, 1997), therefore most of these claims boil down to the effect of the number of parties. 
We control for the proportionality of an electoral system, for which a number of different 
indices have been proposed in the literature (Gallego et al., 2012). In the current analyses, we 
use the least squares index of disproportionality, as calculated and provided by Gallagher 
(2013). 
To investigate the effect of party identification we use a measure based on the question ‘Do 
you usually think of yourself as close to any particular party?’, to which respondents could 
answer either yes or no. As Thomassen and Rosema (2009) claim, this question wording 
                                                             
7
 Formula: �݋݉݌��ݐ݊�ݏݏ�௟����௭∧���௟�� = �೛�ೝ೟��ೞ��−೛೚ೞ�೟�೚೙∑ ௣�|௣���௬���−௠��௡��|೙�=1  
8
 Note that Ezrow inverses this index to become a measure of dispersion rather than compactness as this is more 
straightforwardly understood. We will use the original Alvarez & Nagler formula. 
9
 The Pearson correlation coefficient between the unweighted distance measure and the Dalton index is 0.803, 
the Pearson correlation coefficient between the unweighted distance measure and Alvarez & Nagler’s measure 
of compactness is -0.630 and the Pearson correlation coefficient between Alvarez & Nagler’s measure and 
Dalton’s polarization index is -0.838. 
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possibly captures a more variable attitude than the original concept of party identification. 
Given that the effect of identifying with a particular party on volatility is likely very strong, 
including such a proxy for partisanship is a stringent control when investigating what causes 
voters to switch parties.  
The concept of political sophistication refers to the voters’ level of conceptualization and is 
affected both by the voters’ openness to political information and by their capacity to process 
this information (Campbell et al., 1963; Lachat, 2007; Luskin, 1990). Given that political 
knowledge is often considered the best single indicator of political sophistication (Lachat, 
2007), we rely on political knowledge as measure for political sophistication. Within the 
framework of the CSES, each election survey contains three political knowledge questions. 
Adding up the number of correct answers on the three questions gives us for each respondent 
a political knowledge score between 0 and 3.10 In order to further enhance the comparability 
of this knowledge measure across countries and election samples, we additionally 
standardized political knowledge by dividing respondents’ knowledge score by the election-
specific sample mean (Singh and Thornton, 2013). 
We use several related political attitudes to investigate the impact of political disaffection on 
volatility. Previous research has shown that dissatisfaction with democracy and external 
efficacy are all linked with electoral volatility (Dalton and Weldon, 2005; Dassonneville, 
2012; Söderlund, 2008; Zelle, 1995). Satisfaction with democracy is measured by means of a 
single item asking respondents ‘On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very 
satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]’ (reverse coding). 
For external efficacy, we make use of the items ‘who is in power can make a difference’ and 
                                                             
10 Wrong answers, don’t knows and refusals to answer the questions were all treated  equally as wrong. For a 
number of election samples, only one of both items was included in the survey and therefore only one item is 
included in the efficacy scale. See Appendix I on the elections to which this applies 
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‘who people vote for makes a difference’, both asked on a scale ranging between 1 and 5. 
Given that these items load strongly on a one-dimensional scale (Eigenvalue: 1.47; Explained 
variance: 64.31%), they were added into a 1 to 5 additive scale of external political efficacy.11 
Furthermore, we include socio-structural control variables for respondents' age,  gender,  and 
whether or not they obtained any kind of college degree.  
Missing values on some of the independent variables further reduces the estimation sample to 
29,591 individuals in 33 elections.12 These elections were held in 18 different countries, most 
of which can be considered established democracies. Descriptive statistics for the 
independent variables can be found in Appendix VI. 
3.3. Method 
We investigate the causes of electoral volatility at an aggregate and individual level 
respectively. For the aggregate-level analyses, the dependent variable is the Pedersen index of 
net volatility. Given the continuous nature of this measure, we make use of an OLS 
regression for this analysis. 
Our individual-level dependent variable, party switching, is binary; these analyses will take 
the form of logistic regressions. Furthermore, heterogeneity in the dataset must be taken into 
account. Voters in a particular electoral context are more alike than voters in different 
contexts. Because we want to integrate both individual and contextual theories explaining 
volatility, we use multilevel analysis techniques (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002).   
4. Results 
                                                             
11 For a number of election samples, only one of both items was included in the survey and therefore only one 
item is included in the efficacy scale. See Appendix I on the elections to which this applies. 
12 When taking into account voters switching to and from abstention as well, the sample size is 33,530 (equally 
nested in 33 elections). 
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4.1. The amount of volatility 
We observe considerable  variation in party switching in the sample. As Table 1 makes clear, 
on average, just less than 30% of the 29,591 respondents in the analyses (i.e. those that voted 
twice) report having changed party preferences. The amount of party switching varies 
considerably between the elections included in these data; for example over 60% of Irish 
respondents report switching in the 2007 election. Furthermore, the Dutch electoral context is 
remarkably unstable, an image that is in line with what aggregate level data on volatility 
suggest (Dassonneville, 2013). At the other extreme of Table 1 we find very stable elections, 
such as the Portuguese 2002 election, the British 2005 election and the Spanish 2004 election. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Reading through Table 1 indicates marked variation in the extent to which respondents in 
different election samples report switching parties from one election to another. Before 
investigating whether the relationship between party switching and characteristics of the 
party system are indeed driven by individual-level mechanisms, it is prudent to assess the 
degree to which individual-level switching in the dataset and net volatility actually correlate. 
Figure 1 illustrates a moderate correlation of 0.43 (p<0.05) between the proportion of 
respondents reporting to have switched parties in a particular election sample on the one hand 
and the Pedersen index13 for that same election on the other.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
4.2. Pedersen index of net volatility 
                                                             
13 Own calculation of the Pedersen index for official election results. Pedersen index = ½*{∑ |Δ pi,t|ni=1 } with 
pi,t being the vote share of party i at election t and n being the total number of parties. Information on electoral 
results comes from the European Journal of Political Research, Electoral Studies, West-European Politics and 
on-line sources (www.parlgov.com; www.parties-and-elections.eu). 
16 
 
As a first step we present an aggregate-level analysis, in line with the model presented in the 
original Pedersen paper. We investigate the relationship between our measures of the number 
of parties and systemic polarization, on the one hand, and net volatility—controlling for 
disproportionality—on the other hand. We present three separate models, drawing from 33 
elections in our individual-level sample, in which each measure of polarization discussed 
above is included.  
The effective number of parties is robust to varying polarization measures and points at a 
positive and significant effect on net volatility across each of the models in Table 2. The 
measure of disproportionality and the first two measures of polarization, on the contrary, are 
not significantly related to net volatility. Only compactness reaches a marginal level of 
significance, but clearly the ENEP is the more robust predictor of net volatility.14 In the 
original analysis, Pedersen assumed polarization—rather than the number of parties—
exacerbates volatility. These results strongly suggest the number of parties is associated with 
a high degree of net volatility. The evidence is mixed when relating polarization with 
volatility. Therefore, at the macro-level, there is weak evidence that polarization would be the 
main contextual variable affecting party switching15. 
[Table 2 about here] 
4.3. Individual-level volatility 
Pedersen’s assumption with regard to polarization was clearly framed in individual terms. 
Therefore, we next present the results of a multilevel random intercept model using the CSES 
                                                             
14 Standardizing the ENEP and the measure of compactness (in Model III) to both run from 0 to 1, additionally 
points out that the impact of ENEP (8.99) is larger than the effect of compactness (-5.43). 
15 Pedersen relied on country experts to estimate the number of parties contesting an election in his sample. 
Since his publication, the Effective Number of Electoral Parties index by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) has 
become the standard way to measure this variable. The different result we obtain from Pedersen might therefore 
to some extent also be related to the use of a more fine-grained indicator for this variable. We thank a reviewer 
for pointing to this fact. 
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survey data. Given that the dependent variable is binary (respondents either report having 
switched parties or not), the model takes the form of a logistic regression. Again, we present 
the results of separate models for each  index of polarization.  
The results of these analyses lead to different conclusions regarding which systemic factors 
affect party switching compared to the analysis for net volatility (see Table 3). First, we do 
not observe a significant effect of the number of parties on respondents’ probability to report 
switching parties. The hypothesis that more parties leads to more volatility is not supported 
by these data. We do find a negative and significant effect of disproportionality; as an 
electoral system is more disproportional, voters become less likely to switch parties from one 
election to another.  
According to Pedersen’s theoretical framework, more aggregate-level volatility is driven by 
the reduced ideological distance between parties in more crowded party systems. The results 
of the analyses presented in Table 3 provide suggestive evidence supporting this assumption. 
The effect of polarization on switching parties is significant and in expected directions for 
each of the indicators included: negative for the first two indicators and positive for the 
indicator of compactness.16 Our findings, furthermore, are robust to  all three measures of 
polarization, even the most minimal operationalization—the maximum ideological distance 
between two parties in an electoral system. Our results show that as a party system is more 
compact, voters are more likely to switch parties. 
[Table 3 about here] 
In a next step, we investigate whether the effect of the systemic contextual variables hold 
when controlling for individual-level variables capturing political sophistication, political 
disaffection, and socio-demographics. 
                                                             
16 Given the rather small N at the election level (33), we can safely use less conservative levels of significance  
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As clear from the results in Table 4, the effects of the contextual variables on respondents’ 
probability to switch parties are robust with regard to a large set of individual-level 
predictors. A more disproportional electoral system and the three indicators for polarization 
are still significantly related to lower probabilities of switching parties. The plots of predicted 
probabilities for Models I, II, and III from Table 4 are shown in Figure 2 and give some 
indication of the strength of the effect of polarization. All three indicators increase the 
probability of switching parties by between 15 and 20 percentage points when moving from 
one extreme to another. This can be considered a sizable effect for a single contextual 
variable. 
[Table 4 about here] 
[Figure 2 about here] 
For the individual-level predictors, results are in line with previous research. Older voters are 
significantly less likely to report switching while there is no significant difference between 
men and women’s probability of switching parties. Furthermore, the higher educated are 
significantly more likely to report switching compared to respondents without higher 
education. Second, the term capturing political knowledge squared is negative and 
significant, hinting at a significant curvilinear effect, with the middle knowledgeable 
respondents having the highest probability of switching parties. Third, both political efficacy 
and satisfaction with democracy are significant and negatively related to the probability to 
switch parties, indicating that political disaffection increases voters’ probability to desert the 
party they voted for in the previous election. 
Pedersen’s theoretical assumptions all relate to the impact of contextual variables on voters’ 
probability of switching parties. Empirically, however, Pedersen tested this by means of an 
index of net volatility. As net volatility is affected by the extent to which citizens are 
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mobilized or demobilized for particular elections, differences between his results and our 
findings for party switching could be driven by whether or not abstainers are taken into 
account. To verify the impact of abstention, we have replicated the analyses with an 
individual-level indicator of volatility as the dependent variable. Importantly, this indicator 
considers citizens switching to or from abstention from one election or another as volatile. 
The results of these analyses are reported in Appendix V and clarify that for a broad 
operationalization of volatility, the number of parties—and not polarization—causes 
instability, which is in line with an aggregate-level analysis of net volatility à la Pedersen. 
Our main analyses, by contrast, show that polarization has a much larger effect than the 
number of parties on switching.  
Thus far, our analyses have investigated party switching without taking into account party 
identification. We now model party switching with reference to this strong predictor of vote 
choice. Doing so is a very stringent test, because it can be assumed that partisanship acts as 
an intermediary variable between the contextual and individual-level variables. As we 
demonstrated in Table 5 (see Model I) the direction of the estimated effects holds, but the 
effects of the polarization indices no longer reach a conventional level of statistical 
significance when we add closeness to a party to the analyses.17 While our initial results 
indicate that polarization significantly decreases the probability that individual voters will 
change parties from one election to another, this additional analysis indicates that 
partisanship acts as a powerful barrier to contextual effects. If one takes into account voters’ 
feelings of closeness to a party, it seems as if this renders the choice set irrelevant. To verify 
whether this is indeed the case, we add cross-level interaction terms between partisanship and 
                                                             
17 We only present model I here without interaction terms and maximum left-right distance as polarization 
measure, but the results are similar and non-significant for the Dalton measure and compactness. Results 
available from the authors upon request. 
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the contextual variables into a model. Models II to V offer indications of significant cross-
level interactions between partisanship and our measures of polarization. To ease the 
interpretation of these effects, we plotted the estimated impact of compactness (as estimated 
in Model V) for partisans and nonpartisans separately. As is clear from Figure 3, polarization 
acts to reduce the strong barrier effect of partisanship on party switching. This is evident from 
the fact that the difference between partisans and nonpartisans in their probability to switch 
parties is strongly reduced as the party system is more compact. Even though partisanship is 
still a significant predictor of party switching in highly compact party systems, an 
ideologically dense set of choices does reduce the pronounced differences between partisans 
and nonpartisans that are found in highly polarized settings.  
[Table 5 about here] 
[Figure 3 about here] 
4.4. Additional robustness checks 
One could claim that investigating the impact of contextual variables on voting behavior 
ought to be lagged. Given that the indices of disproportionality and the effective number of 
parties are based on election results, there is a tautological element in explaining voters’ 
behavior in an election by means of indicators that are constructed on the basis of election 
results. Therefore, as an additional test, we included lagged variables for the least squares 
index of disproportionality and the effective number of parties. For the polarization measures, 
by contrast, given that parties’ positions are likely to change considerably over a period of 
multiple years, we assume that respondents’ perception of parties’ positions immediately 
after an election are related more strongly to their perceptions before going to vote than the 
perceptions of parties’ positions years before (see Zaller 1992). These models with lagged 
indicators for disproportionality and the effective number of parties show our results to be 
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robust. Both the direction of the estimated effects and their significance levels withstand this 
test.18 
 
5. Discussion 
Until the present study it was unclear to what extent party-system variables affect the 
probability that individual voters switch parties between elections. Our aggregate level 
analysis shows that up to 40% in the between-election variance in volatility can be explained 
with three party-system level variables, of which the number of parties seems to matter most. 
When exploring this with individual level data, however, we see that it is actually the 
polarization of the party system that increases the likelihood that voters switch between 
elections. We can now confirm Pedersen's claim—made more than thirty years ago—that it is 
the polarization of the parties that matters as a mechanism triggering individual voters to 
switch parties.  
For net volatility, we conclude that the ENEP index is not a proxy for polarization as 
Pedersen assumed. Including both variables in the analysis of the Pedersen index shows that 
polarization is not the influential variable. Our aggregate-level results show a robust impact 
of the number of parties on volatility; this is not so with the individual-level data. This 
discrepancy might be an effect of the compound nature of the aggregate Pedersen index. The 
index captures party switching, but also changes driven by voters who voted in one election 
but abstained in the other. Both of these groups might be influenced by different factors in 
their electoral behavior, with the latter group being more influenced by variables that 
typically drive turnout. This was confirmed by an additional individual-level analysis where 
                                                             
18 Results available from the authors upon request. 
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we included those switching from/to abstention as volatile. Those results demonstrate that the 
number of parties to be influential in this case, but not polarization. This has important 
consequences for the conceptual difference between party switching and volatility. Our 
analyses show that conclusions about what drives party switching cannot—ipso facto—be 
generalized to volatility. The main difference is not between levels of aggregation, but 
between whether or not abstainers are accounted for in the analysis. Therefore, it is important 
that future research makes a clearer conceptual difference between party-switching and 
volatility and investigate separately what factors cause voters to switch parties and what 
factors affect whether or not voters turn out to vote.  
Our additional investigation of the influence of party identification on vote-switching 
confirms its status as a key variable in voter research. Partisanship acts as a powerful barrier 
to party switching, overruling even the impact of the degree of polarization in the choice set. 
The significant interaction effects of partisanship and polarization, however, show that the 
powerful impact of partisanship on partisan stability is strongly reduced when a party system 
is very compact. 
 
Methodologically, we concede that the use of recall data is not optimal to answer the 
hypothesis we investigate here. But this also leads us to emphasize that the only way to make 
important new steps in this very important field is to conduct comparative panel studies in a 
large group of democracies. We realize that this involves a considerable organizational and 
funding effort. Several decades after the Columbia and Michigan studies, we still lack the 
adequate data to answer what seems to be a very elementary question in comparative political 
science. This seems to signal, therefore, that this is the only way forward.  
 Table 1. Degree of party-switching by election 
Election % Stable % Switching N Pedersen index 
(Official vote 
shares) 
Ireland 2007 32.27% 62.73% 330 6.1 
The Netherlands 2010 56.87% 43.13% 1,491 22.5 
The Netherlands 2002 57.78% 42.22% 957 30.5 
New Zealand 2002 59.71% 40.29% 906 8.95 
Estonia 2011 60.80% 39.20% 375 12.95 
The Netherlands 2006 62.31% 37.69% 1,674 20.0 
Norway 2005 64.41% 35.59% 1,450 19.2 
Sweden 2006 64.46% 35.54% 664 15.8 
Finland 2011 65.04% 34.96% 798 15.0 
Sweden 2002 65.05% 34.95% 658 14.4 
Iceland 2009 66.48% 33.52% 698 21.3 
Norway 2001 68.12% 31.88% 1,418 16.1 
Slovenia 2004 68.45% 31.55% 355 21.4 
Denmark 2007 69.86% 30.14% 949 10.0 
Portugal 2005 70.29% 29.74% 1,476 11.3 
Germany 2005 70.44% 29.56% 866 8.1 
Norway 2009 70.54% 29.46% 1,334 6.6 
New Zealand 2008 70.84% 29.16% 535 9.6 
Australia 2007 71.90% 28.10% 1,025 6.8 
Canada 2008 72.84% 27.16% 832 4.4 
Iceland 2007 74.22% 25.78% 896 11.8 
Switzerland 2007 74.57% 25.43% 1,152 6.8 
Czech Republic 2002 75.02% 24.94% 425 11.5 
Australia 2004 75.93% 24.07% 1,259 7.5 
Germany 2002 76.00% 24.00% 1,521 6.5 
Germany 2009 76.32% 23.68% 1,077 12.9 
Finland 2007 77.03% 22.97% 788 6.7 
Switzerland 2003 78.22% 21.78% 707 7.9 
Finland 2003 79.41% 20.59% 680 6.3 
Greece 2009 83.87% 16.13% 496 5.7 
Portugal 2002 85.44% 14.56% 618 8.4 
Great Britain 2005 85.74% 14.26% 512 6.2 
Spain 2004 89.39% 10.61% 669 10.2 
Total 70.12% 29.88% 29,591  
Data: CSES Module 2 and 3. 
 
 Figure 1. Comparison of individual-level party-switching (CSES) and net-volatility (Pedersen 
index) 
 
 
 Table 2. Explaining aggregate level volatility 
 Model I Model II Model III 
 b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
Intercept 2.041 
(5.334) 
-3.138 
(5.073) 
8.584 
(5.548) 
LS -0.409 
(0.293) 
-0.261 
(0.287) 
-0.232 
(0.267) 
ENEP 2.263+ 
(1.093) 
2.301* 
(1.052) 
2.264* 
(1.033) 
Max. Left-right distance 0.187 
(0.589) 
  
Polarization  1.477 
(1.304) 
 
Compactness   -4.484+ 
(2.361) 
N 33 33 33 
R2 0.348 0.367 0.385 
Data: Own calculations of the Pedersen index of net volatility; CSES modules 2 and 3. Standard errors are robust 
for 19 country clusters. Significance levels: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
 Table 3. Explaining individual-level party-switching (contextual predictors) 
 Model I Model II Model III 
 Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) 
Individual level       
Intercept -0.469 (0.614) -0.256 (0.720) -1.876** (0.555) 
Contextual variables       
Ls -0.063* (0.031) -0.067* (0.033) -0.067* (0.031) 
ENEP 0.084 (0.080) 0.088 (0.080) 0.094 (0.078) 
Max. left-right distance -0.106+ (0.060)     
Polarization   -0.215+ (0.127)   
Compactness     0.577* (0.277) 
Model fit statistics       
N individuals 29,591 29,591 29,591 
N elections 33 33 33 
Elections σ² 0.173 (0.045) 0.174 (0.045) 0.167 (0.044) 
Rho 0.050 0.050 0.048 
Data: CSES modules 2 and 3. Null-model: Rho=0.066. Coefficients and standard errors of multilevel logit 
models in Stata via xtmelogit-command. Significance levels: + p<0.1; * p<0.5; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 
 Table 4. Explaining individual-level party-switching (contextual and individual predictors) 
 Model I Model II Model III 
 Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) 
Individual level       
Intercept 1.244+ (0.658) 1.500+ (0.767) -0.161 (0.598) 
Age -0.017*** (0.001) -0.017*** (0.001) -0.017*** (0.001) 
Female 0.016 (0.027) 0.016 (0.027) 0.016 (0.027) 
College education 0.076* (0.030) 0.076* (0.030) 0.076* (0.030) 
Political knowledge 0.065 (0.062) 0.065 (0.062) 0.064 (0.062) 
Political knowledge² -0.067* (0.027) -0.067* (0.027) -0.067* (0.027) 
Efficacy -0.149*** (0.014) -0.149*** (0.014) -0.149*** (0.014) 
Satisfaction with 
democracy 
-0.164*** (0.016) -0.164*** (0.016) -0.164*** (0.016) 
Contextual variables       
Ls -0.061+ (0.033) -0.067+ (0.035) -0.065* (0.033) 
ENEP 0.118 (0.085) 0.122 (0.084) 0.129 (0.083) 
Max. left-right distance -0.106+ (0.064)     
Polarization   -0.226+ (0.135)   
Compactness     0.570+ (0.295) 
Model fit statistics       
N individuals 29,591 29,591 29,591 
N elections 33 33 33 
Elections σ² 0.196 (0.051) 0.196 (0.051) 0.191 (0.050) 
Rho 0.056 0.056 0.055 
Data: CSES modules 2 and 3. Null-model: Rho=0.066. Coefficients and standard errors of multilevel logit 
models in Stata via xtmelogit-command. Significance levels: + p<0.1; * p<0.5; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2. Estimated effect and 90%-confidence intervals of polarization measures on party switching 
 
 
Estimates based on 10,000 simulated observations based on Model I, II and III in Table 4 respectively. 
 
 Figure 3. Estimated effect and 90%-confidence intervals of compactness on party switching by 
partisanship. 
 
Estimates based on 10,000 simulated observations based on Model V in Table 5. 
 
 
 
 
 Table 5. Explaining individual-level switching (contextual and individual predictors) – interactions of polarization with party ID 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
 Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) 
Individual level           
Intercept 1.112+ 0.001 1.069 (0.666) 1.028 (0.660) 1.050 (0.774) 0.519 (0.601) 
Age -0.014*** (0.001) -0.014*** (0.001) -0.014*** (0.001) -0.014*** (0.001) -0.014*** (0.001) 
Female -0.002 (0.027) -0.002 (0.027) -0.002 (0.027) -0.002 (0.027) -0.002** (0.027) 
College education 0.089** (0.031) 0.089** (0.031) 0.088** (0.031) 0.088** (0.031) 0.088** (0.031) 
Political knowledge 0.091 (0.064) 0.091 (0.064) 0.091 (0.064) 0.091 (0.064) 0.091 (0.064) 
Political knowledge² -0.062* (0.028) -0.062* (0.028) -0.062* (0.028) -0.062* (0.028) -0.062* (0.028) 
Efficacy -0.067*** (0.014) -0.067*** (0.014) -0.067*** (0.014) -0.067*** (0.014) -0.066*** (0.014) 
Satisfaction with democracy -0.144*** (0.017) -0.145*** (0.017) -0.145*** (0.017) -0.145*** (0.017) -0.145*** (0.017) 
Close to a party -1.111*** (0.083) -0.884*** (0.208) -0.710*** (0.189) -0.519* (0.262) -1.624*** (0.220) 
Contextual variables           
Ls -0.050 (0.034) -0.049 (0.033) -0.049 (0.033) -0.049 (0.035) -0.054 (0.033) 
Close to a party*Ls 0.006 (0.017)         
ENEP 0.068 (0.085) 0.076 (0.085) 0.069 (0.085) 0.071 (0.084) 0.071 (0.083) 
Close to a party*ENEP   -0.043 (0.043)       
Max. Left-right distance -0.049 (0.065) -0.050 (0.065) -0.035 (0.064)     
Close to a party*Max. Left-right 
distance 
    -0.070* (0.034)     
Polarization       -0.059 (0.137)   
Close to a party*Polarization       -0.156* (0.071)   
Compactness         0.236 (0.298) 
Close to a party*Compactness         0.383* (0.154) 
Model fit statistics           
N individuals 29,591 29,591 29,591 29,591 29,591 
N elections 33 33 33 33 33 
Elections σ² 0.195 (0.052) 0.194 (0.052) 0.191 (0.051) 0.191 (0.051) 0.185 (0.050) 
Close to a party σ² 0.049 (0.018) 0.045 (0.018) 0.041 (0.016) 0.039 (0.016) 0.034 (0.015) 
Rho 0.069 0.068 0.066 0.065 0.063 
Data: CSES modules 2 and 3. Null-model: Rho=0.066. Coefficients and standard errors of multilevel logit models in Stata via xtmelogit-command. Significance levels: + 
p<0.1; * p<0.5; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.
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